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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 NATO 06923

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOL, NATO
SUBJECT: NATO DEFENSE INITIATIVES: DETAILED REPORT OF
REINFORCED EWG MEETING JULY 15
REF: (A) NATO 6839 DTG 151612Z JUL 77, (B) STATE 162516
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SUMMARY: REF A SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF THE REINFORCED
EWG MEETING JULY 15. WE PROVIDE BELOW THE THRUST OF THE
GENERAL, INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE
OPENING TOUR DE TABLE AND A SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION ON
THE DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) FOR THE NINE INDIVIDUAL
TASK FORCES. WE WILL FORWARD THE DECISION SHEET FROM THE
MEETING AND THE FINAL TORS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THEIR
CIRCULATION. END SUMMARY.
AGENDA ITEM I - APPROVAL OF THE DECISION SHEET OF THE LAST
MEETING.

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ASYG MUMFORD (ACTING EWG CHAIRMAN IN THE ABSENCE OF DSYG
PANS) POINTED OUT THAT THE DECISION SHEET FROM THE 17 JUNE
MEETING OF THE EWG (AC/281-DS(77)5 - POUCHED STATE AND DE-
FENSE) CONTAINS AN ERROR. PARAGRAPH (J) ON PAGE 4 INDI-
CATES THAT A REPORT ON THE SHORT-TERM MEASURES WILL BE PRO-
VIDED TO THE EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP BY THE END OF JUNE
1977. NO SUCH REPORT WAS INTENDED TO BE PROVIDED, AND THE

INTERNATIONAL STAFF WILL AMEND THE DECISION SHEET TO DELETE THAT STATEMENT.

AGENDA ITEM II - LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM: TERMS OF REFERENCE OF TASK FORCES.

1. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, MUMFORD MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--A. TERMS OF REFERENCE (TORS) MUST BRING OUT CLEARLY THE NEED TO FOCUS ON THE LONG-TERM AND NOT ONLY ON MID-TERM IMPROVEMENTS.

--B. THE AIM OF EACH TASK FORCE SHOULD BE TO ESTABLISH ACTION PROGRAMS THAT WILL ADAPT THE DETERRENT AND DEFENSE POSTURE OF THE ALLIANCE TO THE NEEDS OF THE 1980'S.

--C. EACH PROGRAM MUST ESTABLISH CRITICAL DATES FOR MULTI-NATIONAL AND NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS.

--D. PROGRAMS MUST SPECIFY MEASURES FOR GREATER ALLIANCE COOPERATION.

--E. THE SUCCESS OF THE EXERCISE WOULD DEPEND CRITICALLY ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH GOVERNMENTS WERE PREPARED TO DEVOTE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES OVER AND ABOVE NATIONAL PLANS. IN CONFIDENTIAL

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MANY CASES MORE THAN A 3 PERCENT ANNUAL REAL INCREASE WOULD BE REQUIRED, SINCE 3 PERCENT MIGHT ONLY MAINTAIN EXISTING CAPABILITIES AND LEAVE NOTHING OVER FOR ADDED IMPROVEMENTS.

--F. IN ADDITION TO THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS, THERE WOULD BE OTHER PRESSURES ON NATIONAL RESOURCES:

----(1) IN MANY INSTANCES THERE WERE STILL OUTSTANDING FORCE GOALS TO 1982. THESE WOULD BE THE OBJECT OF FULL-SCALE REVIEW IN THE FALL DEFENSE REVIEWS.

----(2) SHORT-TERM MEASURES MIGHT HAVE RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS.

----(3) NATO FORCE GOALS UP TO 1984 WERE IN PREPARATION, AND THESE WOULD NEED MINISTERIAL ENDORSEMENT IN THE SPRING OF 1978. THESE FORCE GOALS WOULD COVER THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF MID-TERM REQUIREMENTS, AND SOME WOULD FALL OUTSIDE THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS. THE TASK OF RECONCILING DEMANDS ON RESOURCES WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE IN CAPITALS AND NATO. MUMFORD'S OWN FEELING WAS THAT THE EWG SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT SPECIFIC RESOURCE GUIDANCE AT THIS STAGE, BUT WOULD HAVE

TO MAKE A FINAL RECONCILIATION OF ALL COMPETING DEMANDS ON NATIONAL RESOURCES.

--H. IN VIEW OF THE EXTREME TIME CONSTRAINTS, TASK FORCES WOULD HAVE TO DRAW ON EXISTING, ONGOING WORK; FOR EXAMPLE, THE FORCE PROPOSALS.

--I. TASK FORCES WOULD HAVE TO CONCENTRATE ON A LIMITED NUMBER OF HIGH-PRIORITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS AND NOT, REPEAT, NOT SEEK TO PRODUCE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMS.

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--J. IN THE FIELD OF CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING, MAJOR PROGRAMS WERE ONGOING IN 8 PLANNING BOARDS AND COMMITTEES UNDER THE NAC; FOR EXAMPLE, THE STUDY ON RAPID REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY. LONG-TERM TASK FORCES SHOULD NOT DUPLICATE THE WORK OF THESE BODIES, BUT NEED TO BE AWARE OF THE CEP WORK, HAVE LINKS WITH THE CEP BODIES AND TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE CEP WORK IN THE TASK FORCES' FINAL REPORTS.

--K. THE MODEL TOR THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL PANSA HAD PROVIDED TASK FORCE DIRECTORS ASKED THEM TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES OR RESTRICTIONS THAT IMPEDE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR PROGRAM. MUMFORD SUGGESTED THAT THE EWG ENDORSE THIS REQUIREMENT AND AGREE THAT TASK FORCES

SHOULD NOT, REPEAT, NOT SUBMIT PROPOSALS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OR REORGANIZATION OF THE TOP LEVELS OF NATO; THIS SHOULD BE A TASK FOR THE EWG. (NO REPRESENTATIVE OBJECTED TO MUMFORD'S PROPOSAL.)

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--L. OVERLAP BETWEEN THE WORK OF VARIOUS TASK FORCES APPEARS INEVITABLE; HOWEVER, THIS PROBLEM CAN BE TAKEN CARE OF VIA DIRECT LIAISON AMONG TASK FORCE DIRECTORS. IF TASK FORCE DIRECTORS IN SOME CASES SHOULD BE UNABLE TO RESOLVE OVERLAP PROBLEMS, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL COULD BRING THE PROBLEMS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE EWG FOR RESOLUTION. A CARDINAL PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE THAT ONLY ONE TASK FORCE WOULD DEVELOP A PROGRAM IN ANY ONE AREA.

2. MUMFORD THEN MADE A TOUR DE TABLE FOR OPENING REMARKS, STARTING WITH GENERAL COLLADAY (DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE). GENERAL COLLADAY STATED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (MC) HAD REVIEWED THE DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE IN DETAIL AND WAS QUITE PLEASED WITH THEM IN GENERAL. HE DID NOT INTEND TO TRY TO 'WORD-SMITH' THE TORS AT THE DAY'S MEETING BUT HE WOULD OFFER SEVERAL POINTS FOR TASK FORCE DIRECTORS' CONSIDERATION.

--A. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AGREED FULLY WITH MUMFORD'S REMARKS ON THE NEED TO FOCUS EFFORT, TO DEVELOP ACTION PROGRAMS, AND TO COME UP WITH SPECIFIC MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT. HE NOTED THAT TASK FORCE DIRECTORS NEEDED SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR TERMS OF REFERENCE. HOWEVER, THEY ALSO NEEDED TO SET OUT SOME SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. IN SOME CASES, THIS HAD NOT BEEN DONE; THE MILITARY COMMITTEE DID NOT FEEL IT NECESSARY TO AMEND THE TORS BUT CONSIDERED THAT THE FINAL SUBMISSION MUST SET OUT DEFINITE OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES. TASK FORCE DIRECTORS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR RECOMMENDING PRIORITIES AND TRADE-OFFS WITHIN THEIR OWN PROGRAMS.

--B. CONCERNING "THE THREAT," THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CONSIDERED THAT EACH TASK FORCE SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE SAME

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ASSUMPTIONS. ACCORDINGLY, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE HAD PREPARED A STATEMENT FOR INCORPORATION IN ALL TORS, WHICH WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF. IF TASK FORCE DIRECTORS REQUIRED SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE, THEY SHOULD SO ADVISE THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-

TARY STAFF, WHICH WOULD COORDINATE A RESPONSE. IN ADDITION, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CONSIDERED THAT THE USE OF TERMS IN THE TOR SHOULD BE CONSISTENT AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED NATO DEFINITIONS. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CONSIDERED THIS REQUIREMENT BASICALLY ADMINISTRATIVE AND OFFERED THE SERVICES OF THE IMS TO COORDINATE ALL TORS.

--C. CONCERNING RESOURCES, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AGREED WITH CHAIRMAN MUMFORD THAT THE INITIAL GUIDANCE FOR THE TASK FORCE DIRECTORS SHOULD NOT BE SPECIFIC BUT SHOULD USE GENERAL TERMS, SUCH AS "... THE NEED FOR PROGRAMS TO BE REASONABLY AFFORDABLE."

--D. ADDRESSING NATIONAL PARTICIPATION, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SAW THIS TAKING TWO ASPECTS:

----(1) FIRST, TORS SHOULD SET OUT THE TYPE AND DEGREE OF NATIONAL SUPPORT NEEDED FOR TASK FORCE PURPOSES, E.G., NATIONAL EXPERTS.

----(2) TORS SHOULD ADDRESS THE TYPE AND LEVEL OF LIAISON AND CONSULTATIONS THAT THE TASK FORCES PLAN TO UNDERTAKE WITH NATIONS. IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE FINAL PRODUCT REFLECT NATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS.

--E. WHILE THE MILITARY COMMITTEE FULLY SUPPORTED THE LONG-TERM EXERCISE, IT CONSIDERED THAT THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS COULD NOT SUPPLANT CURRENT, ONGOING EFFORTS SUCH AS THE

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SHORT-TERM MEASURES AND REGULAR NATO DEFENSE PLANNING.

--F. GENERAL COLLADAY STRONGLY SUPPORTED MUMFORD'S REMARKS CONCERNING DUPLICATION AND OVERLAPS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT TASK FORCE DIRECTORS CONDUCT THE REQUIRED LIAISON, BUT, IN ADDITION, THE EWG HAD THE RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP AN EYE ON, AND TO MONITOR, TASK FORCE WORK. GENERAL COLLADAY STRESSED THE NEED FOR TIMELY SUBMISSION OF REPORTS AND FOR TASK FORCE DIRECTORS TO FOLLOW THE SPECIFIED PROCEDURE -- THAT IS, THAT THEY SEND THEIR REPORTS DIRECTLY TO THE EWG AND SIMULTANEOUSLY FURNISH A COPY TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. SPONSORING NATO COMMANDERS, OR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL (DEFENSE SUPPORT) WERE FREE TO MAKE THEIR OWN VIEWS KNOWN, AND WOULD NOT BE BOUND BY THE TASK FORCE REPORT.

--G. CONCLUDING, GENERAL COLLADAY NOTED TWO REMARKS THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE HAD MADE CONCERNING CONFIDENTIAL

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THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS:

----(1) TASK FORCE DIRECTORS SHOULD APPROACH THEIR WORK WITH A CERTAIN SOBERNESS; THEY SHOULD NOT TRY TO "REACH FOR THE STARS" AND FAIL TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS. EQUALLY, THE TASK FORCE DIRECTORS MUST NOT BE GIVEN TASKS THAT COULD NOT BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE SUBMISSION OF FINAL REPORTS IN THE SPRING OR TASKS THAT COULD BE DONE BY OTHERS.

----(2) CONCERNING TIMING, 1 MARCH 1978 WAS THE EARLIEST TIME, AND PERHAPS THE RIGHT TIME, FOR TASK FORCE DIRECTORS TO SUBMIT THEIR FINAL REPORTS. THIS WOULD LEAVE ONLY A SHORT TIME FOR THE EWG TO OBTAIN NATIONAL VIEWS ON THE PROGRAMS.

3. THE US REP (AMBASSADOR KOMER) POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS IN THE HAPPY POSITION OF NOT HAVING TO SAY VERY MUCH IN HIS OPENING INTERVENTION SINCE HE COULD ENDORSE THE REMARKS OF THE CHAIRMAN AND OF GENERAL COLLADAY. HE HOPED THAT THE KEY POINTS FROM THESE REMARKS WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE DECISION SHEET. HE AGREED WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE THAT THE LONG-TERM EXERCISE SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED BY SOBERNESS. REGARDING RESOURCES, AMBASSADOR KOMER POINTED OUT THAT TASK FORCE DIRECTORS SHOULD NOT BE UNDULY CONSTRAINED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EXERCISE; THEY SHOULD BE FREE TO LOOK AT WHAT IS REQUIRED DURING THE

COURSE OF THEIR TASK FORCE WORK. THEY SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER, WHEREVER POSSIBLE, TRADE-OFFS AND REPROGRAMMING. IN THIS REGARD, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT NATIONS, INCLUDING HIS OWN, WERE NOT SPENDING THE RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO DEFENSE AS WISELY AS POSSIBLE. HE ALSO SUPPORTED THE NEED FOR A LONG-TERM LOOK; PROGRAMS THAT MIGHT NOT BE FEASIBLE IN 1984
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MIGHT WELL BE FEASIBLE IN 1985, 1990 OR, EVEN, 1992. AMBASSADOR KOMER ADDED THAT HE COULD NOT OVER-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHED TO THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS AND REMARKED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD MOUNTED A LARGE SUPPORTING EFFORT. HE WAS AWARE THAT MANY AROUND THE TABLE SAW THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS AS A "BUY AMERICAN" EXERCISE. THESE SUSPICIONS WERE JUSTIFIED, GIVEN THE UNITED STATES' PAST RECORD. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THOSE WHO HELD THESE SUSPICIONS WOULD BE SURPRISED AND WOULD SEE DEEDS FROM THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL AS WORDS. THE UNITED STATES WAS CONVINCED THAT THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS COULD LEAD TO A CREDIBLE DETERRENT AND DEFENSE. HOWEVER, SUCH A RESULT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT PAYING A PRICE IN PEOPLE, MONEY AND PAIN. HE CLOSED BY REMARKING THAT THE TASK FORCE DIRECTORS COULD NOT SATISFY ALL NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE, BUT THEY SHOULD PROPOSE WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

4. THE TURKISH REP (DEFAD TOPUR) SAID THAT ANKARA'S INABILITY TO SEND A SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JULY 15 MEETING DID NOT INDICATE THAT HIS CAPITAL DID NOT ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS. UPON INSTRUCTIONS FROM ANKARA, TOPUR THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING TWO POINTS:

--A. TASK FORCE DIRECTORS MUST TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION TURKEY SUPPLIED WAS SAFEGUARDED SO THAT IT DID NOT FALL INTO THE HANDS OF NATIONS NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. HE RECOMMENDED THAT EACH TASK FORCE DIRECTOR, WHEN IN CONTACT WITH TURKISH AUTHORITIES, DISCUSS HOW HE INTENDED TO FULFILL THIS REQUIREMENT.

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--B. THERE MIGHT BE A NEED FOR INTERIM REPORTS, IN ADDITION
TO THE PROGRESS REPORTS DUE LATE THIS COMING AUTUMN.

----REGARDING TOPUR'S FIRST POINT, MUMFORD REMARKED THAT IT
WAS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO INSIST
THAT INFORMATION IT SUPPLIED BE PROPERLY SAFEGUARDED. THUS,
THE EWG COULD ENDORSE TOPUR'S STATEMENT ON THIS POINT.
REGARDING THE INTERIM REPORT, MUMFORD SUGGESTED THE EWG
MEET MID-TO-LATE SEPTEMBER (NOT NECESSARILY AT REINFORCED
LEVEL) TO RECEIVE ORAL REPORTS FROM THE TASK FORCE
DIRECTORS. GENERAVWOLLADAY SUPPORTED MUMFORD'S PROPOSAL
FOR AN ORAL REPORT, BUT ADDED THAT MID-TO-END SEPTEMBER
WOULD BE A BUSY TIME FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND NOTED
THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD BE MEETING IN CHIEF OF
STAFF SESSION AT AROUND THAT TIME.

5. THE NORWEGIAN REP (HOLST - SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DEFENSE) GENERALLY ENDORSED THE REMARKS MADE BY THE CHAIR-
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MAN AND BY THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.
HE REMARKED THAT THE AIM OF THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAMS
WOULD BE TO PROVIDE INCREASED COHERENCE AND FOCUS TO
ALLIANCE EFFORTS. HE ENDORSED THE INTENTION TO PROVIDE
UNIFORM ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE THREAT; REMARKED ON THE
NEED FOR AN ACTION-ORIENTED APPROACH; STRESSED THE NEED TO
SET PRIORITIES; STRESSED THAT A LONG-TERM PLANNING EXERCISE
WAS THE OBJECT OF THE CURRENT EFFORT; AGREED THAT THE EWG
SHOULD NOT SUPPLY SPECIFIC RESOURCE GUIDANCE AT PRESENT;
STRESSED THE NEED FOR NATIONS AND THE ALLIANCE TO ALIGN
PRIORITIES; AND POINTED OUT THE NEED FOR THE LONG-TERM

PROGRAMS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.

6. THE DUTCH REP (DEFAD WYNAENDTS) REMARKED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED THE LONG-TERM EXERCISE BOTH IMPORTANT AND TIMELY. THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY STRESSED THE NEED TO PLACE ALLIANCE PLANNING ON A LONG-TERM BASIS AND TO INCREASE ALLIANCE COOPERATION. THEY HAD ALSO UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEFICIENCIES, ON A REGIONAL, AS WELL AS ALLIANCE-WIDE BASIS. HE ADDED THAT THE PROGRAMS MUST BE ACTION ORIENTED, BE REALISTIC, AND SET PRIORITIES AS A BASIS FOR CHOICE. HE ACCENTED THE NEED TO INVOLVE NATIONS CLOSELY, AND TO KEEP THE PROGRAMS, IN SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, CONSISTENT WITH NORMAL NATO DEFENSE PLANNING PROCEDURES. HE BELIEVED THAT SOME TORS SET GOALS THAT WERE TOO SPECIFIC, AND THAT MIGHT NEED REFINEMENT IN THE COURSE OF TASK FORCE ENDEAVORS. HE CAUTIONED AGAINST SETTING OVERLY AMBITIOUS GOALS. CONCERNING ASSUMPTIONS, HE WOULD PREFER A GENERAL REFERENCE TO AGREED NATO DOCUMENTS AND OMISSION OF POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS MUST NOT PRE-JUDGE THE OUTCOME OF THE EAST-WEST STUDY. ON RESOURCES, HE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO TRY TO MAKE RESOURCE CONFIDENTIAL

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GUIDANCE SPECIFIC, BUT STRESSED THAT PROGRAMS MUST BE REASONABLE AND THAT THE FINAL DECISION ON RESOURCE LEVELS COULD ONLY BE ARRIVED AT IN THE FINAL STAGES OF THE LONG-TERM PROGRAM. (NOTE: MR. WARMENHOEN, MFA, HEAD, NATO SERVICE, WAS AT THE TABLE WITH WYNAENDTS.)

7. THE FRG REP (BRIGADIER GENERAL ALTENBURG - DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, MILITARY, POLITICAL AND OPERATIONS DIVISIONS, MOD) STATED HIS REMARKS WOULD BE MUCH IN LINE WITH THOSE OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND THAT HE CONSIDERED THE TORS A GOOD BASIS FOR FUTURE WORK. THE FRG'S REMARKS WOULD BE DIRECTED MORE TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE TORS THAN TO SUBSTANCE. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO MINIMIZE OVERLAP BUT ADDED THAT CONCERN FOR OVERLAP SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WATER DOWN RESULTS. HE FELT THAT TORS SHOULD CONTAIN A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR NATIONAL INPUTS. TORS SHOULD BE BROAD ENOUGH TO ALLOW TASK FORCE DIRECTORS FLEXIBILITY, BUT THE DEFINITION OF AIMS COULD, IN SOME TASK FORCES, BE BETTER STATED. HE REMARKED THAT SOME TORS CONTAINED PHRASES THAT LOOKED LIKE FINDINGS RATHER THAN DIRECTIONS FOR EXPLORATORY WORK. CONCLUDING HIS REMARKS, ALTENBURG STRESSED THE NEED FOR TASK FORCES TO SET FORTH PRIORITIES CLEARLY.

8. THE DANISH REP (WAHL, FROM MOD) AGREED WITH REMARKS

MADE BY THE EARLIER SPEAKERS. HE APPLAUDED TASK FORCE DIRECTORS FOR THEIR EXCELLENT AND SPEEDY WORK, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A GOOD BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT NOT ALL TORS LOOKED FAR ENOUGH AHEAD. SOME TORS APPEARED TOO COMPREHENSIVE AND DETAILED: IN PARTICULAR THE TORS OF TASK FORCES 1 (READINESS) AND 5 (AIR DEFENSE).

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HE CONSIDERED THAT TASK FORCE DIRECTORS WOULD HAVE TO FOCUS ON A LIMITED NUMBER OF HIGH-PRIORITY IMPROVEMENTS IN EACH FIELD. HOWEVER, SOME TORS SEEMED TO LIST SPECIFIC PROBLEMS, WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO LEGAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES. HE STRESSED THAT AGREEMENT TO THE TERMS OF REFERENCES DID NOT IMPLY ANY COMMITMENT ON DENMARK'S PART. HE AGREED WITH EARLIER REMARKS CONCERNING RESOURCE GUIDANCE. HE STRESSED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES BELIEVED IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT TASK FORCE DIRECTORS ESTABLISH EARLY LIAISON WITH NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY SUBSTANTIAL CONSULTATIONS. A STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT SHOULD BE IN ALL TORS. HE ADDED THAT THE CLOSE CONSULTATION ON THE SHORT-TERM PROGRAMS HAD BEEN MOST SATISFACTORY. AS PREVIOUS SPEAKERS HAD DONE, WAHL STRESSED THE NEED TO AVOID DUPLICATION IN TASK FORCE WORK, THE NEED FOR COMMON ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE THREAT, AND THE NEED FOR THE PROGRAMS NOT TO BECOME A PAPER EXERCISE. IN CLOSING, HE REMARKED ON THE IMPORTANCE HIS AUTHORITIES ATTACHED TO

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LINKING THE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS TO THE NAC STUDY ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

9. THE ITALIAN REP (VICE ADMIRAL PATRELLI) REGRETTED THAT ROME HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO SUPPLY A HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATIVE, DUE TO A NUMBER OF EARLIER COMMITMENTS. THIS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS LACK OF SUPPORT IN ROME FOR THE LONG-TERM EXERCISE. IN GENERAL, HIS AUTHORITIES WERE SATISFIED WITH THE TORS. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE THREE PROMOTIONAL LAWS THAT HAD RECENTLY BEEN ENACTED REPRESENTED THE MAXIMUM EFFORT THAT ITALY COULD PRODUCE FOR THE NEXT TEN YEARS.

10. THE UK REP (WHITMORE - ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENSE) REMARKED THAT, IN UNDERTAKING THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM, THE ALLIANCE WAS BREAKING NEW GROUND; THE PROGRAM WOULD INVOLVE A MAJOR EFFORT FOR ALL ALLIANCE MEMBER COUNTRIES AND FOR NATO STAFFS. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE EFFORT WAS NECESSARY AND WAS A SENSIBLE WAY TO SUPPLEMENT CURRENT WORK, TO LOOK AHEAD IN A SYSTEMATIC MANNER, AND TO DEVISE REALISTIC PROGRAMS. HE ENDORSED FULLY THE OPENING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN AND BY GENERAL COLLADAY. HE CONSIDERED THAT THE DRAFT TORS WERE GENERALLY WELL MATCHED TO THE TASK IN HAND AND WERE WELL DESIGNED TO PRODUCE EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS. HE OFFERED A FEW GENERAL POINTS, WHICH HE SAID WERE INTENDED PRIMARILY TO PROMOTE CONSISTENCY AMONG THE TORS:

--A. THERE WOULD BE GREAT MERIT IN MAKING THE ASSUMPTIONS BASICALLY THE SAME FOR ALL TASK FORCES.

--B. HE AGREED IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO GIVE TASK FORCE DIRECTORS SPECIFIC RESOURCE GUIDANCE AT THE OPENING

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STAGES OF THEIR WORK; HOWEVER, DIRECTORS MUST PROCEED ON A BASIS OF REALISM AND SHOULD NOT "REACH FOR THE STARS" AND LATER COME UP WITH RESULTS THAT DID NOT MATCH RESOURCES LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE. FINAL PROGRAMS MUST INDICATE PRIORITIES AND POSSIBLE TRADE-OFFS WITHIN THE PROGRAM, TO FACILITATE THE TASK OF THE EWG IN RECONCILING ALL THE PROGRAMS TO RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS. HE, TOO, STRESSED THE NEED FOR TASK FORCE DIRECTORS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL ONGOING WORK IN THE ALLIANCE, AND TO COORDI-

NATE AMONG THEMSELVES.

CONCLUDING, HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE LIAISON BETWEEN TASK FORCES AND NATIONS, AND HE ENDORSED THE REMARKS OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CONCERNING THE NEED FOR EXPERT HELP FROM CAPITALS

11. THE CANADIAN REP (ENDERSON - CHIEF POLITY PLANNING, MOD) SAID HE COULD BASICALLY ENDORSE REMARKS BY OTHERS. HE FORESAW THE NEED FOR SOME MECHANISM WHEREBY TASK FORCE DIRECTORS COULD COME BACK TO THE EWG WITH ANY AMENDMENTS THEY HAD FOUND NECESSARY FOR THEIR TORS. MUMFORD ANSWERED THAT THE EWG COULD BE CONVENED ON SHORT NOTICE AND HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE GUIDANCE TO TASK FORCE DIRECTORS AT ALL STAGES OF THEIR WORK.

12. THE BELGIAN REP (DEFAD - MAJOR GENERAL TAYMANS) STRESSED THE NEED FOR TASK FORCE DIRECTORS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EXISTING MID-TERM PLANS, WHICH NATIONS HAD ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO IMPLEMENT. CREATION OF NEW MID-TERM OBLIGATIONS WOULD GIVE RISE TO SOME DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. (NOTE: ERIC BAL, HEAD OF NATO AFFAIRS, MFA, WAS AT THE TABLE WITH DEFAD TAYMANS.)

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13. INVITING DISCUSSION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TORS, MUMFORD STRESSED THE NEED TO AVOID DETAILED DRAFTING AROUND THE TABLE. HE REQUESTED, AND THE EWG AGREED, THAT WHERE CONSENSUS, IN PRINCIPLE, WAS POSSIBLE ON REQUESTED CHANGES TO THE TORS, THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF AND TASK FORCE DIRECTORS WOULD WORK OUT THE DETAILED WORDING. AMBASSADOR KOMER STATED THAT HE WOULD NOT INSIST ON APPROVAL, OR EVEN DISCUSSION, OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES (REF B) THAT THE US HAD PREVIOUSLY CIRCULATED, BUT ASKED ONLY THAT TASK FORCE DIRECTORS SHOULD TAKE THE US PROPOSALS INTO ACCOUNT AS APPROPRIATE, WHEN REVISING THEIR TOR. NO ONE OBJECTED TO AMBASSADOR KOMER'S SUGGESTED PROCEDURES.

14. DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL TOR WAS AS FOLLOWS:

A. READINESS (TASK FORCE (TF)1). THE TASK FORCE DIRECTOR (TFD), RADM NICHOLSON (US), SAID THAT HIS TASK FORCE WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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READY TO BEGIN WORK; THAT HE RECOGNIZED THERE WAS OVERLAP WHICH WOULD BE ELIMINATED BY CONSULTATION WITH OTHER TFD'S; THAT HE WAS PREPARED FOR AND WANTED NATIONAL INPUT; AND FINALLY, THAT THE TF HAD ALL THE OBJECTIVES IT COULD HANDLE. THE DCMC RAISED A NUMBER OF POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION, AMONG WHICH WERE: THE INCLUSION OF NATO TRAINING; THE NEED TO ADDRESS RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE); AND THE MAJORITY MC VIEW THAT ANTI-ARMOR SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY THE CNAD INSTEAD OF TF 1. THE EWG CONSENSUS WAS THAT TF 1 SHOULD RETAIN ANTI-ARMOR, DRAWING ON THE SAME PERSONNEL WHO WORKED THE SHORT-TERM ASPECTS OF ANTI-ARMOR. THE TFD ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TF 1 COULD LOOK AT LIMITED ASPECTS OF ROE'S AND TRAINING. THE TURKISH REP MADE A STRONG STATEMENT CALLING FOR THE TF TO DEFER WORK ON "MORE FORCES" UNTIL IT COMPLETES WORK ON IMPROVEMENTS TO "COMMITTED FORCES." FOLLOWING SOME DEBATE, THE EWG AGREED THAT TURKISH CONCERN COULD BE ACCOMMODATED THROUGH DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN THE TF AND TURKEY.

B. REINFORCEMENT (TF 2). THE TFD, VADM JUNGUS (UK) BRIEFLY OUTLINED THE OBJECTIVES OF HIS TASK FORCE ON REINGORCEMENT, STRESSING THAT IT WOULD COVER THE ENTIRE PROCESS FROM THE INITIAL COLLECTION POINTS IN REINFORCING NATIONS THROUGH THE VARIOUS STAGES OF TRANS-SHIPMENT TO THE POINT OF DESTINATION IN THEATER. HE CAUTIONED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO IMPROVE THE WHOLE REINFORCEMENT PROCESS AND EXPLAINED THAT HIS TASK FORCE WOULD SELECT 6-10 KEY AREAS OF DEFICIENCY AND ATTEMPT TO "PUT THEM RIGHT." THE EWG ACCEPTED SOME EDITORIAL CHANGES FROM JUNGUS AND THE TURKISH REP. JUNGUS STATED THAT THE JOB OF THE TF WAS TO HELP DECIDE WHAT SHOULD BE DONE, BUT ULTIMATELY IT WOULD BE UP TO NATIONS TO DECIDE WHAT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. HE

EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SCEPC ROLE IN THIS
INITIATIVE AREA, HIGHLIGHTING THE FACT THAT THE WORK IN
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CIVIL AREAS WOULD BE REPORTED TO THE NAC AND THAT IN MANY
CASES IT WOULD RECEIVE CONSIDERATION IN NATO CAPITALS BY
MINISTRIES OTHER THAN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. THE US REP
REASSURED HIM THAT THE US UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT AND AGREED
THAT PARAGRAPHS 4B AND C COULD BE RETAINED IN THE TOR, WITH
THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE IDEA OF "REQUIREMENTS" FOR
DEFICIENCIES" IN PARAGRAPH 4C.

C. RESERVE MOBILIZATION (TF 3). THE TFD, MGEN ZUBER (GER),
RECAPPED BRIEFLY THE MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF HIS TASK FORCE AND
SAID THAT KEY ELEMENTS SUCH AS CONSIDERATION OF ADDITIONAL
RESERVES, TIME-PHASING OF PROGRAMS, AND AVOIDANCE OF DRAW-
DOWN OF STANDING FORCES WERE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD. HE STATED
THAT "NOTHING WILL BE DONE WHICH IS TO THE DETRIMENT OF
STANDING FORCES. WE DO NOT WANT TO MOVE FROM A DETERRENT
STRATEGY TO A MOBILIZATION STRATEGY." HE COMMENTED ON THE
PAUCITY OF CURRENT DATA AVAILABLE IN NATO ON RESERVE FORCES
AND THE NEED TO LIMIT THE TASK FORCE EFFORTS TO HIGH
PRIORITY AREAS. ZUBER EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT HIS EFFORTS
MIGHT IMPINGE ON THE NATO FORCE STRUCTURE, AND THUS GO
BEYOND HIS CHARTER, AND ASKED FOR MORE CONCRETE GUIDANCE.
THE US REP EXPLAINED THAT THE US DEFINITION OF PROGRAMS WAS
VERY BROAD AND CERTAINLY INCLUDED FORCES AS WELL AS THINGS
LIKE EQUIPMENT AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES. HE ADDED THAT NATO
HAD ONLY MID-TERM FORCE GOALS, AND THAT THE LONG TERM PRO-
GRAM NEED NOT CONFLICT WITH THEM. ZUBER ACCEPTED THAT
EXPLANATION, AND AMBASSADOR KOMER AGREED THAT ZUBER'S
INTENTION TO ADDRESS THE MATTER OF ADDITIONAL RESERVE

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COMBAT UNITS MET THE US CONCERNS.

D. NATO MARITIME POSTURE (TF 4). THE TFD, VADM WHITTLE (US), GAVE A SHORT SYNOPSIS OF HIS TASK FORCE'S OBJECTIVES, CHARACTERIZING THE EFFORT AS AN ACTION PROGRAM THAT WOULD ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN 6-10 KEY AREAS. HE PLACED ADDED EMPHASIS ON THE POINT THAT, ALTHOUGH TF 4 WOULD HAVE INTERFACE WITH TF 10, ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES, AS WITH ALL THE OTHER TASK FORCES, THE MARITIME PROGRAM WOULD DEAL ONLY WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES. HE ALSO GAVE ASSURANCES THAT TF 4 WOULD DEAL WITH SUCH SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS AS CONTRIBUTIONS OF FRIENDLY NAVIES AND THE NEED TO ENHANCE REPLENISHMENT AT SEA CAPABILITY. THE FRG REPRESENTATIVE (ALTENBURG) MADE THE POINT THAT THE MARITIME TASK FORCE SHOULD CONDUCT ITS WORK ON A WORLD-WIDE BASIS AND THAT THE CONTEXT HAD TO BE MUCH BROADER THAN JUST EUROPE. THE NETHERLANDS REP (WYNAENDTS) STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES URGED THAT THE TASK FORCE ESTABLISH REQUIRE-
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MENTS WHICH WOULD BE BROKEN OUT BY REGION. WHITTLE RESPONDED THAT THE MNCS ALREADY ESTABLISH QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS IN THE NATO FORCE GOALS PROCESS. BEARING IN MIND THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF MARITIME FORCES, HE QUESTIONED THE UTILITY OF A REGIONAL BREAKOUT.

3. AIR DEFENSE (TF 5). THE TFD, RADM PRICE (UK), DESCRIBED THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH HIS TASK FORCE INTENDED TO TAKE. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR LAND-MARITIME INTERFACE AS WELL AS CAREFUL EFFORT TO AVOID DUPLICATING THE WORK OF OTHER NATO AGENCIES. THE FINAL TOR WILL INCLUDE MINOR REVISIONS TO ACCOMMODATE THE FOLLOWING:

- LIMIT SCOPE TO EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT.
- EMPHASIZE THE LAND-MARITIME INTERFACE.

- CONSIDER FORCES ORGANIC TO THE FIELD ARMY.
- USE AGREED NATO TERMS.
- - TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT ON AIR DEFENSE BEING PREPARED BY MNCS FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.
- - ELIMINATE MENTION OF SPECIFIC AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS.
- - ELIMINATE REFERENCE TO MC 54/1 FOR DEFINING NATO AIRSPACE.
- - IDENTIFY OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM.
- F. C3 (TF6), THE TFD, DR. STONEY (SHAPE, OPENED CONFIDENTIAL

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DISCUSSION BY INFORMING THE EWG THAT HE HAS CHANGED THE SUBORDINATE STRUCTURE OF THE TASK FORCE. IT NOW WILL HAVE FOUR (RATHER THAN FIVE) TASK GROUPS ADDRESSING: C3 FOR NATO, TACTICAL LAND AND AIR FORCES, TACTICAL MARITIME FORCES, AND EARLY WARNING. THE TASK GROUPS WILL DEVELOP OPTIONS RATHER THAN A SINGLE PROGRAM FOR EACH AREA. THE GERMAN REP TOOK EXCEPTION TO THE TOR AS WRITTEN. ALTHOUGH HE ADDRESSED REWORDING IN SPECIFIC PARAGRAPHS, THE THRUST OF HIS OBJECTION WAS THAT USE OF TERMS SUCH AS "INTER-NETTING" AND "FUSE" (PARAS 2B AND C OF "SUBSTANCE") COUPLED WITH "PREPARE A PROGRAM" IN THE "AIM" CONSTITUTED PREJUDGMENT OF CONCLUSIONS. THE CHAIRMAN, WITH CONCURRENCE OF THE TFD, ACCEPTED THE GERMAN OBJECTION AND AGREED TO ACCOMMODATE IT THROUGH REWORDING OF THE TOR. THE MC REP COMMENTED THAT THE TERM "INTERNETTING" IS TOO RESTRICTIVE, AND THE TOR SHOULD ALLOW FOR OTHER COURSES (SUCH AS INTERCONNECTION). CONTINUING ON BEHALF OF THE MC, HE EMPHASIZED: DEVELOPMENT OF A MILITARY REQUIREMENT FOR INTERCONNECTION OF C3 SYSTEMS, ADOPTION OF A FAMILY OF COMSEC EQUIPMENT, AND DEFINITION OF A NATO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK (MEECN). STONEY RESPONDED THAT THE CHECKLIST FOR TASK GROUP LEADERS INCLUDES CONSIDERATION OF SECURITY AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE. HE AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE IDEA OF A FAMILY OF COMSEC, AND HE STATED THAT SOME FORM OF MEECN IS ESSENTIAL FOR NATO.

- G. ELECTRONIC WARFARE (TF7). RADM KRIJGER (NE), CHIEF OF ALLIED STAFF, CINCHANG, REPRESENTED CINCHAN. HE OPENED DISCUSSION WITH A POLITE BUT VERY DEFINITE PROTEST OVER CHANGES MADE TO THE PROPOSED TOR BY THE EDITORIAL

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BOARD WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH THE TFD. KRIJGER PROPOSED SEVERAL CHANGES TO THE "AIM" PARAGRAPH OF THE TOR. US XD LEGERE (REPRESENTING THE US IN THE TEMPORARY ABSENCE OF AMB KOMER FROM THE TABLE) CHALLENGED KRIJGER'S PROPOSED CHANGES, CITING THE LACK OF A PROGRAMMATIC THEME IN THE WORDING. LEGERE SUGGESTED THAT THE TERM "MEASURES" BE DROPPED IN FAVOR OF THE WORD "PROGRAMS", THAT THE AIM CALL FOR THE PROGRAM TO BE STRUCTURED TO BE COVERED BOTH THE MID- AND THE LONG-TERM, HE SAID THAT THE US COULD ACCEPT DELETION OF THE REFERENCES TO "MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE" AND "FULLY ACCEPTABLE" LEVELS OF CAPABILITIES. KRIJGER AGREED READILY. THE ONLY OTHER COMMENT ON THE TOR CAME FROM THE NORWEGIAN REP (HOLST), WHO SUGGESTED THAT THE "METHOD OF WORK" SECTION REFLECT THE FACT THAT ALLIED EW EFFORTS SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUSIVELY THE RESULT OF THREAT CHARACTERISTICS BUT WOULD ALSO BE AFFECTED BY ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONDITIONS. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT THE TOR, WHEN CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE TF'S
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FIRST TASKING MESSAGE (USNATO 6866 DTG 152034Z), FORM AN

ACCEPTABLE BASE ON WHICH TO BUILD THE EW PROGRAM. THE TASKING MESSAGE CONTAINS, ALMOST VERBATIM, THE LANGUAGE OF THE ALTERNATE EW TOR PREPARED BY US OFFICERS FROM JCS, SHAPE, CINCHAN, AND THE IMS (USNATO 6630 DTG 091009Z JUL 77). END COMMENT.

- H. RATIONALIZATION (TF8). THE TFD, ASYG LABERGE, SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO ASPECTS OF RATIONALIZATION WHICH THE TOR DID NOT COVER, I.E., INTEGRATED OR RATIONALIZED TRAINING AND DOCTRINE. HE DID NOT INCLUDE TRAINING AND DOCTRINE BECAUSE THE EXPERTISE OF THE TASK FORCE MEMBERS DID NOT LIE IN THOSE AREAS. THE CHAIRMAN COMMENTED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE TOR WERE RESTRICTED TO EQUIPMENT CONSIDERATIONS, THE RATIONALIZATION TASK FORCE WOULD NOT DEVELOP EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS, BUT RATHER WOULD SET UP PROCEDURES WITHIN WHICH ALLIANCE-WIDE STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY WOULD BE IMPROVED. HE SAID IT WAS ANOTHER CASE OF A TASK FORCE REALISTICALLY LIMITING ITSELF TO WHAT IT THOUGHT IT COULD ACCOMPLISH BEFORE NEXT MAY. THE EWG ACCEPTED THE TOR ON THAT BASIS, WITHOUT FURTHER COMMENT.

- I. CONSUMER LOGISTICS (TF 9). THE TFD, LTGEN (USA RET) HEISER, INTRODUCED HIS TASK FORCE TOR BY STRESSING THAT TF 9 WOULD NOT "RE-INVENT THE WHEEL"; THAT IT WOULD CANDIDLY AND FRANKLY ISOLATE THE MORE SERIOUS PROBLEMS; AND THAT IT WOULD PROPOSE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT ACTIONS TO MEET ESSENTIAL LOGISTICS OBJECTIVES. THE UK REP (WHITMORE) SUGGESTED A STRONGER TASK FORCE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SENIOR NATO LOGISTICIANS CONFERENCE (WHEN ACTIVATED) AND QUESTIONED THE CONTINUING NEED FOR THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON A NATO CONSUMER LOGISTICS FORUM. HEISER
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ASSURED THE EWG THAT TF 9 WOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH ALL RECOGNIZED NATO BODIES AND DESIGNATED NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES.

AGENDA ITEM III - OTHER FOLLOW-UP ACTION.

MUMFORD STATED THAT TASK FORCE DIRECTORS WOULD NEED EARLY GUIDANCE ON THE FORM AND CONTENT OF THEIR INTERIM REPORTS. THE EWG HAD ALREADY AGREED THAT DIRECTORS SHOULD GIVE ORAL REPORTS TO THE EWG IN SEPTEMBER. CONCERNING THE REPORT TO MINISTERS IN DECEMBER, MUMFORD SUGGESTED THAT THIS REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE FRAMED SO AS TO CAUSE THE LEAST DISRUPTION TO TASK FORCE DIRECTORS' WORK. CONSEQUENTLY, HE FAVORED REPORTS WHICH WOULD SIMPLY GIVE STATUS OF WORK AND PROBLEMS NEEDING MINISTERS' ATTENTION, NOT SUBSTANTIVE REPORTS AMOUNTING TO MINI-FINAL REPORTS THAT WOULD

PREVIEW FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS. NONE OBJECTED TO MUMFORD'S SUGGESTIONS.

AGENDA ITEM IV - ANY OTHER BUSINESS

A. THE CHAIRMAN RAISED THE ISSUE OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES NECESSARY TO CONDUCT THE WORK OF THE NATO INITIATIVES PROGRAM CITING THE NEED FOR STAFF, TRAVEL, CONSULTANTS AND THE LIKE, AND SUGGESTED THAT COSTS SHOULD LIE WHERE THEY FALL. HE ASKED THAT IF ADDITIONAL CREDITS WERE NEEDED, THE APPROPRIATE BODY, I.E, TASK FORCE OR NATO STAFF ELEMENT, MAKE ITS NEEDS KNOWN SOON SO THAT BUDGET COMMITTEES COULD ACT. HE CALLED FOR THE SUPPORT OF NATIONS TO MEET THE NEEDS.

B. THE CHAIRMAN RAISED THE US PAPER ON THE PROPOSED

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DELETION OF THE REQUIREMENT TO PRODUCE A "FURTHER REPORT ON ALLIANCE COOPERATION" FOR THE DECEMBER DPC IN MINISTERIAL SESSION (USNATO 6758, DTG 131156Z JUL 77). NOTING THE ADDED LOAD WHICH MIGHT BE PLACED ON THE TASK FORCES WITH RESPECT TO THE US PROPOSAL, THE CHAIRMAN SUGGESTED WITHDRAWING THE REQUIREMENT, AND RELYING ON TASK FORCE REPORTS NEXT SPRING TO FULFILL ANY NEED FOR INFORMATION ON ALLIANCE COOPERATION. THE EWG AGREED. THE CHAIRMAN

SAID THE SYG WOULD CIRULATE A PO REFLECTING EWG AGREE-
MENT, FOR FORMAL APPROVAL BY NATIONS.BENNETT

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